Abstract. For each of (i) arbitrary stochastic reset, (ii) deterministic reset with arbitrary period, (iii) reset at arbitrary constant rate, and then in the sense of either (a) first-order stochastic dominance or (b) expectation (i.e. for each of the six possible combinations of the preceding), those laws of random times are precisely characterized that are rendered no bigger [rendered no smaller; left invariant] by all possible restart laws (within the classes (i), (ii), (iii), as the case may be). Partial results in the same vein for reset with branching are obtained. In particular it is found that deterministic and arbitrary stochastic restart lead to the same characterizations, but this equivalence fails to persist for exponential (constant-rate) reset.
Introduction
Let T and R be two given probability laws on the Borel subsets of [0, ∞]. Suppose some time-tocompletion (resp. time-to-failure) of a process has, ex-ante, law T . Imagine further that -with a view to minimizing (resp. maximizing) this time -rather than letting the process just run its course, we reset the process at a (random, independent) time distributed according to the law R, starting an independent copy of the process thereafter, and that then we repeat this over and over again until completion (resp. failure).
The time to the latter now has a different, ex-post, law, T R , say. In (almost) precise terms: if (T i ) i∈N is a sequence of independent with law T distributed random variables, and (R k ) k∈N is an independent sequence of independent with law R distributed random variables, then T R is the law of the random timeT given by:T = R 1 + · · · + R k−1 + T k on {R 1 < T 1 , . . . , R k−1 < T k−1 , T k ≤ R k }, k ∈ N (1.1) (a.s., under certain assumptions on R and T ; we make it fully precise below). Of special interest are the cases when R corresponds to: (i) resetting the process at deterministic epochs that are a fixed amount of time r ∈ (0, ∞) apart (viz. R = δ r , the Dirac mass at r); (ii) restarting the process at a constant rate λ ∈ (0, ∞) (viz. R = Exp(λ), the exponential law of mean λ −1 ). Now, depending on the particulars of R and T , T R may, or may not be smaller (resp. bigger) than T .
Here smaller (resp. bigger) is meant in either of the two natural senses: in first-order stochastic dominance; in mean. A natural qualitative question arises: which are the laws T that are always rendered (a) no bigger (resp. (b) no smaller), or that are left (c) invariant -in first-order stochastic dominance or just in mean, as the case may be -under restart (arbitrary, deterministic, of constant rate)? Indeed if a distribution falls under case (a) (resp. (b)), then (and only then) we are assured that restart can do no harm when seeking to minimize (resp. maximize) the time to completion (resp. failure), and can further even be strictly beneficial if in addition (c) is precluded.
By way of example, let T be the law of the first passage time above the level 1 of a standard linear Brownian motion B; it is finite a.s. with infinite mean. Restarting B at fixed deterministic epochs, say, will render this first hitting/passage time to be of finite mean. But will it be even first-order stochastic dominated by the time without restart? And if we restart an exponentially distributed time, then its law is surely left invariant by this resetting. Is it the only law of which this is true? The puporse of this paper is to provide precise answers to such and similar questions.
In case when we are seeking to minimize the time to completion, a natural complement to the above consists in allowing the effort to be increased by the same factor l ∈ N ≥2 on each iteration, so that on first reset (if it occurs) not one, but l independent processes with the same distribution as the original one are started, termination occuring at the minimum of their respective times to completion, unless a second reset occurs before that, in which case l 2 independent procecess are started, and so on. We will have occasion to
give (partial) answers to the above questions also in the context of this "restart with l-fold branching".
The author was orginally motivated to explore the above subject matter after reading the paper [7] .
Indeed it is therein that the procedure described in the previous paragraph was called restart with branching (following on from [4] , where the term "branching search" was introduced). In a main result of [7] , a universal condition is found on T under which exponential restart with branching of sufficiently small rate renders the completion time to have a smaller mean (than without restart), generalizing the analogous no-branching result of [9] . On the other hand, in [4] the analysis is made with a fixed deterministic reset law R = δ τ (where τ ∈ (0, ∞)); in particular those laws are characterized that are rendered invariant by δ τ -restart with some β-fold branching (where β ∈ N too is fixed). Thus the questions raised above (and their answers)
are a complement to what has hitherto been considered (established): we are asking for conditions that characterize (weak) improvement/invariance over arbitrary reset (possibly only within the deterministic, or exponential class), separately for the case without branching, and with a given l-fold branching, l ∈ N ≥2 .
Looking out further in terms of existing literature, stochastic restart (a.k.a. reset/restart search) has been the subject of relatively intense recent study, especially in the statistical physics literature, and has been so in problems ranging across biology, chemistry, physics and data/computer science. We refer the reader to the introductions of the papers [4, 7, 9, 5] for an overview of this literature that looks at reset from the point of view of minimizing the time to completion. From the opposite stance -maximizing the time to failure -restart falls naturally under reliability (aging, longevity) theory [2, 11, 1] , in which case it is better called (preventative) replacement. Given its relevance in applied probablity it therefore seems worthwhile to record the precise conditions under which it is always benefical, to which we now turn. Several (counter)examples are given along the way.
General notation. Given a probability law Q we will write
If a probability measure is denoted by P, then its expectation operator is denoted simply with the symbol E. Finally: we use supp(T ) to denote the support of a probability law
id is the identity on [0, ∞].
Reset and stochastic order
Let T be a probability law on the Borel sets of [0, ∞], viz. the probability law of a random time. To avoid trivial considerations we will assume that T ((0, ∞]) > 0 and that inf supp(T ) = 0, i.e. if T ∼ T , then T is positive with a positive probability, and smaller than any given positive number with a positive probability.
We denote by F : [0, ∞) → [0, 1] the distribution function of T and let F := 1 − F be the tail function of T . Note F determines T uniquely and that in terms of F our standing assumptions read: F (0) > 0 and F (r) < 1 for all r ∈ (0, ∞). We set F (∞) := 0. 
identifying conditions under which T is rendered no bigger (resp. no smaller) by reset we lose no generality by insisting on the reset laws to satisfy "R((0, ∞]) > 0", since δ 0 is no bigger than any law (resp., as it will emerge, if T ({0}) > 0, then T cannot be no smaller under arbitrary (or just deterministic) reset anyway, the assumption "R((0, ∞]) > 0" on the reset laws notwithstanding). On the other hand, the assumption all defined on a commom probability space (Ω, F , P). Then T R is the law of the random timeT :
We denote by F R the tail function of T R . To define T R let, again on a common probability space (Ω, F , P),
It will not be formally relevant, and we do not assume it, but we mean to investigate below the situation when T is non-lattice. In the lattice case the natural considerations would be different (only the reset laws carried by the same lattice as the one which supports T would be meaningfully included in the discussion).
2.1.
Reset and the usual stochastic order. We focus first on the behavior of T under reset relative to first-order stochastic dominance. To avoid any ambiguity, we recall that given two probability laws A and B Our first proposition identifies precisely the laws that are, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, no bigger (no smaller, invariant) under stochastic reset, equivalently (as it emerges) deterministic reset. It becomes almost obvious once stated; still some minimal amount of care is needed in the proof to handle the general resetting. We adhere to the convention log 0 := −∞ below.
Proposition 2.5. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) T is no bigger (resp. no smaller, invariant) under reset:
all reset laws R.
(ii) T is no bigger (resp. no smaller, invariant) under deterministic reset:
is subadditive (resp. superadditive, additive); i.e. for all r ∈ [0, ∞) and
other words, F is supermultiplicative (resp. submultiplicative, multiplicative).
Furthermore, F is multiplicative iff T = Exp(λ) for some λ ∈ (0, ∞).
Remark 2.6. If F (0) = 1 and F is supermultiplicative, then T can have no finite atoms. More generally, if F is supermultiplicative, then all finite atoms of T have (relative to the left limit) size at most 1 − F (0).
Remark 2.7. In the preceding proposition, we cannot "separate condition (iii) according to t ∈ [0, ∞)": for a fixed t ∈ [0, ∞), the implication
fails to hold in general, as the next example demonstrates. We will however see that if we replace in the preceding ½ (t,∞) with the identity map, then the implication "⇐=" becomes an equivalence "⇐⇒" (also if in the first statement we insist on the inequality for all reset laws R in lieu of δ r ). But this then cannot be a (completely) "universal" phenomenon (it must presumably owe itself to the particularities of the identity map /additivity/).
Remark 2.9. If − log F is subadditive, then from the right-continuity of F and from
it follows that F > 0 (everywhere). On the other hand, if − log F is superadditive, then we must have
Remark 2.10. Property (iii) is used as the defining property of the class of "new worse than used" (resp.
"new better than used", "new same as used") distributions in reliability theory [6, 8] . See [3, Lemma 2.1] for another (unrelated) statement involving stochastic order that is equivalent to the submultiplicativity of F .
Proof. Suppose first that T is no bigger under deterministic reset. Let r ∈ (0, ∞) and set R := δ r . Assume the setting and notation of Definition 2.4. Let also k ∈ N 0 and t ∈ [kr, (k + 1)r). Then
Now let {x, y} ⊂ [0, ∞), 0 < x > y. Setting r := x, k := 1, t := x + y in the preceding shows that
Taking limits, exploiting the right-continuity of F , ceteris paribus, the premise 0 < x > y can be weakened to 0 ≤ x ≥ y and the subaddivity of − log F follows. Similarly if we had assumed that T was no smaller (invariant) under deterministic reset, the superaddivity (additivity) of − log F would have obtained.
Now suppose that − log F is subadditive. Let R be a reset law and assume again the setting and notation of Definition 2.4. Let also t ∈ [0, ∞). We compute and estimate:
where the final equality follows from the fact that by the law of large numbers, a.s.
(because P(R 1 > 0) > 0) and (to handle the telescopic series) from the fact that
. Similarly submultiplicativity (multiplicativty) of F would yield that T is no smaller (invariant) under reset.
Next, assume (v) holds. We may express, for r ∈ (0, ∞),
whence (iii) follows. Conversely assume the latter and let R be a reset law. We see that
The assertion of (iv) follows.
Assume now F (x)F (y) = F (x + y) whenever {x, y} ⊂ [0, ∞). We see that necessarily, for all x ∈ (0, ∞),
F (x) > 0 , for otherwise the functional equation for F would imply that F (x/2 n ) = 0 for all n ∈ N, which would contradict the right-continuity of F at 0 (and the fact that F (0) > 0). Taking logarithms the theory of Cauchy's functional equation implies that F (x) = e −λx for all x ∈ [0, ∞), for some λ ∈ R; necessarily then λ ∈ (0, ∞) (because T ([0, ∞)) > 0). It means that T = Exp(λ).
Remark 2.11. It is clear from (2.2) that if F is supermultiplicative (resp. submultiplicative), then even if in Definition 2.4 we, ceteris paribus, drop the premise that the R i , i ∈ N, are identically distributed with law R, and ask instead merely that
, then still the law ofT is first-order stochastic dominated by (resp. first-order stochastic dominates) T .
We now look at exponential reset. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly the condition for T to be no bigger (resp. no smaller) in first-order stochastic dominance is now different. Proposition 2.12. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) T is no bigger (resp. no smaller, invariant) under exponential reset:
(ii) F Exp(µ) (t) is ≤ F (t) (resp. ≥ F (t), = F (t)) for all sufficiently small µ ∈ (0, ∞) for all t ∈ [0, ∞) (in this order of qualification!).
(iii)
,∞) . Using the above equivalent conditions it is then elementary (if tedious) to check that T is no bigger under exponential reset, but it is not no bigger under reset (a little thought reveals that the fact that T has atoms is not crucial, it just simplifies the computations).
Remark 2.14. We see that in order for T to be no smaller under exponential reset it is necessary that
Proof. We leave the "(resp. )" parts to the reader. Let µ ∈ (0, ∞), set R := Exp(µ), and assume the setting and notation of Definition 2.4. Remark that F (0) = F R (0). Define S n := R 1 + · · · + R n for n ∈ N 0 ; S n , n ∈ N, are the arrival times of a homogenous Poisson process N = (N u ) u∈[0,∞) of intensity µ. We then see from (2.2) that, for any given t ∈ (0, ∞),
If now this is ≤ F (t) for all sufficiently small µ ∈ (0, ∞), then subtracting F (t)e −µt in this inequality, dividing by µt and letting µ ↓ 0, we find that E[F (R 1 )F (t − R 1 )|N t = 1] ≤ F (t). Since, conditionally on {N t = 1}, R 1 is uniform on [0, t], we conclude that
Conversely, suppose the preceding inequality obtains for all t ∈ (0, ∞). Let t ∈ (0, ∞), k ∈ N ≥2 , and let, on some probability space (Ω, F , P),
be the order statistics of 0, U 1 , . . . , U k , t, and set V
are the "spaces" between the random variables 0, U 1 , . . . , U k , t. Analogous quantitities are introduced for 0, U 1 , . . . , U k−1 , t. Then
An inductive argument allows to conclude that the latter is ≤ F (t). Therefore, by (2.5) and the orderstatistics properties of homogeneous Poisson processes, we find that T is no bigger under exponential reset.
Assume now that t 0 F (u)F (t − u)du = tF (t) for all t ∈ [0, ∞). Taking Laplace transforms we find that, withF (λ) :
Solving the differential equation we see that the fact that Γ(2, λ) = Exp(λ) ⋆ Exp(λ) admits a density that is continuous and vanishing at zero ensures that T ⋆ Γ(2, λ) admits a continuous density in turn) and pass to the limit λ → ∞ by bounded convergence (grantedly only at all continuity points of F from [0, sup supp(T )), but it is enough).
As in the previous subsection we identify first the laws that are rendered no smaller (no bigger, invariant) under arbitrary (or just deterministic) reset.
Proposition 2.17. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) T is no bigger (resp. no smaller, invariant) under reset in mean:
) for all reset laws R.
(ii) T is no bigger (resp. no smaller, invariant) under deterministic reset in mean:
(iii) For all r ∈ (0, ∞):
Remark 2.18. In order for T to be no smaller under reset in mean it is necessary that F (1) = 1.
Proof. Let R be a reset law and assume the setting and notation of Definition 2.4. Then
Multiplying both sides by 1 − P(T 1 > R 1 ), we see that
for all reset laws R iff it holds true for all R of the form δ r , r ∈ (0, ∞), which in turn is equivalent to, with standing for ≤ (resp. for ≥, =),
for all r ∈ (0, ∞). The final assertion follows from Lemma 2.15.
To conclude our study of stochastic reset without brancing, we would like to express the property of being no bigger (no smaller, invariant) under exponential reset in terms of the residual mean function m, since this will best relate it to the findings of Proposition 2.17. Below we set
(2.8)
In particular T is invariant under exponential reset in mean (in the obvious meaning of this qualification)
Remark 2.20. In the context of Remark 2.16:
• As long as t 0 dz n(z) ≤ t n(0) for all t ∈ (0, ∞) and n(z) < n(0) for some z ∈ (0, ∞) (which may happen), then T is no bigger under exponential reset in mean, yet T is not no bigger under reset in mean.
• One can take n non-constant and n ≥ n(0), in which case T is no bigger under reset in mean, but it is not invariant under reset in mean.
Remark 2.21. It was essentially observed in [9, Eq. (4)] (and it also follows from the considerations of the
Example 2.22. Let k ∈ (0, 1) and
so the condition of Remark 2.21 is trivially met. On the other hand, m(t) = t + k for t ∈ [0, ∞), and one checks easily that condition (2.8) fails to hold for all µ ∈ (0, ∞), so that T is not no bigger under exponential reset in mean.
Remark 2.23. Beyond "universally qualifying" over µ ∈ (0, ∞) in (2.8) apparently little (useful) can be said in the direction of characterizing T to be no bigger (smaller) under exponential reset in mean.
Proof. Set R := Exp(µ). Then, in the notation and setting of Definition 2.4, It seems plain that being no bigger under reset in mean cannot in general imply the same without the qualification "in mean". Still we make an example in which this occurs explicit.
Example 2.25. Let F (t) = e −t−0.1
It is then an elementary exercise to verify that T is no bigger under reset in mean, but it is not no bigger under exponential reset.
Restart with branching and stochastic order
Retain the setting of the start of Section 2.
Definition 3.1 (l-fold reset, l ∈ N). Let R be a reset law and l ∈ N. We define a new probability law, T 
We denote by
In parallel to the results on reset without branching of the previous section we have Proposition 3.3. Let l ∈ N ≥2 . We have the following assertions (in their by now obvious meaning).
(1) T is no bigger under l-fold reset iff it is no bigger under deterministic l-fold reset, which occurs iff
T cannot be invariant under deterministic l-fold reset.
(2) T is no bigger under l-fold exponential reset iff F
for all t ∈ [0, ∞), which occurs iff
Proof. We may refrain from reporting all the details of the computations, because the ground is already familiar to us from the case of reset without branching.
(1). Suppose first F (x + y) ≥ F (x)F (y) l whenever {x, y} ⊂ [0, ∞). Then, similarly as in (2.2) except that now in the setting and notation of Definition 3.1,
Conversely, suppose that T is no bigger under l-fold deterministic reset. Then essentially exactly the same procedure as the one surrounding (2.1) shows that indeed
y ≤ x (hence also if y > x), and that furthermore, if T is even invariant under l-fold deterministic reset, then there is equality in the preceding (albeit only for y ≤ x). But if the latter prevails, then for all a ∈ (0, ∞), n ∈ N, we have F (na) = F (a) (n−1)l+1 . In consequence F ( (2). Let next µ ∈ (0, ∞), set R := Exp(µ), and assume the setting of Definition 3.1. Define S n , n ∈ N 0 , and N as in the proof of Proposition 2.12. From (3.1), for any given t ∈ (0, ∞),
Therefore, a simple modification of the argument of the proof of Proposition 2.12 establishes the asserted characterization of when T is no bigger under l-fold exponential reset.
Remark 3.4. Let l ∈ N ≥2 and let R be a reset law. It follows from (3.1) by integrating the survival function, that
If R 1 ∼ Exp(µ) for a µ ∈ (0, ∞), then this simplifies to But, unlike in the case of reset without branching, neither of these expresssions seems particular amenable to further analysis in the direction of establishing a "nice" explicit condition for when T is no bigger/is invariant under (deterministic, exponential) l-fold reset in mean. See however [7, Eq. (5) ] for a condition on when
for all sufficiently small µ ∈ (0, ∞).
Remark 3.5. Let l ∈ N ≥2 . An inspection of the proof of item (2) above reveals that if T is to be invariant under l-fold exponential reset, then necessarily t 0 F (u) l F (t − u)du = tF (t) for all t ∈ (0, ∞). In view of Proposition 3.3 (1), and also the results concerning reset without branching, it seems reasonable to conjecture that this cannot occur, but the author was not able to prove this. (It is immediate that only F continuous with F (0) = 1 can/could possibly verify the preceding relation.)
